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POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Court of Justice of the European Communities: A Novel
Judicial Institution
WERNER FELD
Moorhead State College, Moorhead

I •

There is little question that the potential implications
of the Common Market for America and for Europe
have stimulated more discussions in the United States
during the last twelve months than any other topic, with
the possible exception of Cuba. Yet, while these discussions have ranged far and wide and have covered intensely most aspects of the European Economic Community-the technical name for the Common Marketone of its institutions, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, has received largely only peripheral
treatment. 1 However, this judicial institution deserves
greater consideration and scrutiny because over the years
it has assumed a very significant role in the economic
development of Western Europe. The Court's decisions
have potentially far-reaching economic and political implications not only for the relations between the Member
States of the Common Market, but possibly also for the
external relations of these states.2 It is even conceivable
that the Court of Justice may perform similar functions
for the future unification of Europe as were performed
by our Supreme Court under John Marshall for the
strengthening of our newly established national government. It appears, therefore, to be appropriate as well as
timely, to take a closer look at some of the Court's salient features and to draw attention to the significance of
certain judgments which it has rendered .
Organization: As its name suggests, the Court is the organ of adjudication not only for the European Economic
Community (EEC) , but also for the European Coal and
Steel Community (Ecsc) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Court as constituted
today is the direct successor of the Court of Justice of
the European Coal and Steel Community which had been
in existence and functioning since 1953. When the Common Market and Euratom were established in 1958, the
Court was given a new name but little else was changed.
The "new" Court took over most of its predecessor's

.
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personnel, its localities, and its docket of nearly forty
cases that were pending. 3
The Court is composed of seven judges who are appointed for a term of six years by the common consent of
the governments of the Member States. The president of
the Court is elected by his fellow judges for a period of
three years. After the expiration of their terms, the judges
may be re-appointed and the president may be re-elected.
Professor M. A. Donner, the president of the Court, is
now in his second term. 4
The judges must be chosen from among persons of
"undisputable independence" who are qualified to hold
the highest judicial office in their respective countries or
who are jurists of high standing. They may be removed
from office only if, in the uanimous opinion of the other
members of the Court, they no longer fulfill the required
conditions or meet the obligations of their office. They
may, of course, submit their voluntary resignation from
the Court at any time, and since the inception of the
Court, a number of justices have vacated their offices in
this manner. 5
The judges are assisted by two "advocates-general"
who are also appointed for six years by the governments
of the Member States, whose appointments are renewable, and who must meet the same professional qualifications as the judges. The two advocates-general who
were appointed when the Court of the Coal and Steel
Community was established in 1953, are still occupying
their positions. Their functions are "to present publicly,
with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned
conclusions on cases submitted to the Court of Justice,
with a view of assisting the latter in the performance of
its duties . . . " 6 The advocates-general do not represent
in any way either the Communities or the public; they
function only in the interest of justice. It is significant
that in the nearly hundred judgments rendered by the
Court up to the end of February, 1963, the opinions of
35

the advocates-general have been accepted by the justices of the Court in the majority of the cases. Although
the institution of the advocate-general is unknown in the
Common Law systems, it is used extensively in procedure
before France's highest courts. In fact, the advocategeneral in the judicial organization of the Communities
is modeled after the Commissioner of the French Conseil
d'Etat, the most important of the French administrative
courts and the apex of the French administrative court
system.7
In principle, the Court sits in plenary session. However, it is authorized to set up chambers, and two such
chambers composed of three judges each have been
established to conduct preliminary examinations or to
decide certain categories of cases. Yet some cases always
must be heard by the Court in plenary session; these are
cases submitted by a Member State or by one of the institutions of the Communities, or cases referred to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary decision by a municipal court or tribunal of the Member States. Finally, the
Court sits as a chamber of three judges to decide cases
arising from proceedings which have been instituted by
civil servants of the Communities for alleged grievances
against the institutions employing them.
Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is
extensive and its breadth attests to the great importance
of the Court in the structure of the European Communities. The provisions granting jurisdiction to the Court
are scattered throughout the Treaties underlying the three
Communities, the Conventions on the Statute of the
Court, and the Protocols on Privileges and Immunities
of the Communities. The governments of the Member
States are under obligation not to submit any dispute
concerning provisions contained in these compacts to any
other judicial institution than the Court of Justice.P
The primary function of the Court is to ensure the rule
of law in the interpretation and application of the Treaties and implementing regulations. In order to discharge
this responsibility, the Court has been given comprehensive jurisdiction over the other organs of the Communities, the Member States, and private persons and enterprises in the Member States. The Treaties provide that
the Court shall rule on suits of Member States against
each other for non-fulfillment of the terms of the Treaties, on suits filed by the various institutions of the Communities against each other or by a Member State against
one of the institutions regarding the legality of one of
their administrative acts, and on appeals by staff members of the institutions against decisions concerning
them.1°
In addition, there are three novel jurisdictional features which make the Court quite unprecedented and
which require elaborating comments. Departing from the
classic doctrine of international law that access to international tribunals is only open to states, the Treaties
permit any private person, natural or legal, to bring a
case before the Court to appeal against the action of one
of the executive bodies of the Communities. These
bodies, the High_Authority of the ECSC and the Com-
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m1ss1ons of the EEC and Euratom, are empowered to
by-pass the governments and administrations of the
Member States and to address their regulations and decisions directly to the national subjects. It is therefore
only fair that, in turn, these individuals should be entitled to lodge an appeal against those acts with the
Court. According to the Treaties, private persons have a
right to demand the annulment of individual decisions
affecting them on one of the following grounds : lack of
legal competence; major violation of procedure; violation of the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their
application; and abuse of power which is the exercise
of power for an improper purpose. 11
Another unique feature of the Court is the right of the
executive organs of the Communities to file a suit against
Member States alleged to be defaulting on their Treaty
obligations. With regard to the particulars of this right,
the provisions of the Treaties are not uniform. One essential difference is the ability of the ECSC executive organs to apply certain economic sanctions against a Member State if the Court upholds their contention that this
state is in default of its obligations and if the government
of that state does not comply with the ruling of the
Court. 12 On the other hand, the newer EEC and Euratom
Treaties do not permit the application of sanctions in
such a case. 1 3 Although this may be considered as a
backward step from the goal of achieving European political integration, it must not be overlooked that the
prospect of creating an unfavorable public image and
offending public opinion in the Member States may also
serve as a very effective sanction. Certainly, none of the
governments of the Member States would care to be
summoned before the Court by either of the Commissions to hear its action or inaction condemned in law.
It is noteworthy that the EEC Commission has used
with vigor its power to bring before the Court of Justice
the governments of Member States which appeared to
have violated their obligations under the Treaty. In 1961
two actions were filed against the Italian government;
one for restricting the importation of pigs and pork products, and the other for applying to imported radio parts
a higher tariff than justified by the tariff in force on J anuary 1, 1958, the date to be used for the calculation of
the progressive tariff reductions. A third suit was brought
in 1962 against the governments of Belgium and Luxembourg for levying a higher fee on import licenses for
gingerbread than :was permitted by the "Common Market" provisions of the EEC Treaty. In all three cases,
the Court upheld the contention of the EEC Commission
that these actions of the Member States constituted violations of their Treaty obligations and the governments
involved promptly complied with the rulings of the
Court. 14 A fourth case against the German Federal Republic for placing unwarranted restrictions on the importation of beef was dropped by the EEC Commission in
April of 1962 after the federal government had rectified
the alleged violation of the Treaty.
The third unusual feature of the Court is its power to
bind domestic jurisdictions in their interpretation and
application of the three Treaties. The purpose of this
The Minnesota Academy of Science
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power is to prevent six different interpretations and applications of the Treaties by the national courts which
could frustrate the goal of a Common Market under
common rules. To avoid such an undesirable result, the
Treaties, particularly the EEC and Euratom Treaties,
provide that whenever questions concerning their interpretation are raised in a case before a national court or
tribunal from whose decision no appeal lies under national law, such court or tribunal is obliged to refer the
question to the Court of Justice of the Communities for
its ruling. The preliminary decision of this Court with
regard to the interpretation to be adopted must be observed by the national court in its ruling on the case before it. This joins the Court of Justice and the national
jurisdictions into a common system for a common purpose.
During its 1961-62 term the Court of Justice received
its first request for a preliminary decision under the
EEC Treaty. The request came from the Court of Appeals at The Hague and pertained to the interpretation of
the anti-trust regulations of that Treaty. The ensuing
ruling of the Court of Justice which clarified these somewhat obscure regulations has been acclaimed as one of
the most significant judgments rendered since the Court's
establishment. 16 Another preliminary decision by the
Court was pronounced as recently as February 5, 1963.
It was based on a request of a Dutch administrative court
of the last resort which asked for an interpretation of article 12 of the EEC Treaty. This article prohibits the
introduction of any new duties or other charges on commercial transactions between Member States. The Court
of Justice held that this article created individual rights
of private persons in the Common Market countries
which the national courts had to observe and safeguard!'
The types of jurisdiction discussed so far do not exhaust the comprehensive jurisdictional authority conferred upon the Court by the Treaties. It would exceed
the scope of this paper to examine or even mention every
competence the Court possesses. 18 Yet, it must have already become obvious from this limited survey that the
Court is much more than an international tribunal in the
traditional sense. Indeed, the functions assigned to the
Court justify its classification as an administrative and a
"constitutional" tribunal. As a consequence, it has been
deemed appropriate to ascribe a "supranational" character to the Court of Justice since it exercises powers
normally only possessed by national courts.

Procedure: The procedure before the Court of Justice is
divided into two stages. In the first stage it is conducted
in written form and usually involves the exchange of
four briefs between the contending parties as well as the
submission of documentary evidence and supporting papers. In the second stage, the procedure is oral. It includes the reading of the report presented by the iugerapporteur (reporting judge) and the hearing by the
Court of witnesses, experts, and the legal advisors of the
parties. In accordance with his mission of assisting the
Court in rendering a just decision, the advocate-general
can also question witnesses as well as representatives and
Proceedings, Volume Thirty-one, No. 1, 1963

counsel of the parties. Witnesses and experts may be
sworn in accordance with the laws of their national
states. If any violation of their oath is committed and if
the Court of Justice reports such a violation, the Member
States are obliged to regard this in the same manner as
a breach of law before a domestic court and to prosecute
the violator. The procedure closes with the presentation
of arguments by the advocate-general in which this official presents his opinion on the points of law raised in
the case and accordingly proposes the ruling he thinks
appropriate. 20
A difficult problem in the procedure before the Court
is the recognition of four official languages: French, German, Italian, and Dutch. The Rules of Procedure of the
Court establish the basic principle that the plaintiff may
select the language in which the case will be heard. However, if the defendant is the government of a Member
State or a natural or legal person residing in a Member
State, the case is heard in the language of the defendant.
Since the judges have not been chosen for their linguistic
ability, but for their knowledge of the law, all documents
brought before the Court are translated in each of the
three other languages and during the oral procedure a
simultaneous translation is provided. Furthermore, all
publications of the Court such as judgments are published in all four official languages, but only the copy in
the language actually used during the procedure before
the Court is considered to be authentic. 21
The deliberations of the Court are private; not even
the advocates-general participate in the judicial conference. In the event that differences of opinion arise during the deliberations, a vote is taken and the opinion of
the majority of the judges becomes the basis for the decision. However, the manner of voting is not indicated
in the judgment which appears as a single uniform decision. 22 Professor Donner, the president of the Court, has
defended this practice on the grounds that it protects the
independence of the judges. Moreover, according to Professor Donner, it forces the judges to work out an agreement on the wording of the decision ensuring opinions
which are understandable throughout the Member States
of the Communities and which thus contribute to the
establishment of a common fund of legal notions and
principles. 28
The power and importance of the Court is reflected by
the fact that no formal appeals can be lodged against its
decisions. The Court rules in the first, last, and only instance on cases before it. In this connection, the advocate-general assumes a particularly significant role since
he assists in clarifying the factual and legal aspects of a
case and thus performs to some degree a function which
is normally fulfilled for other supreme jurisdictions by
the lower courts. Under certain, specifically prescribed
circumstances, however, a case may be brought again
before the Court. A request for review of a decision may
be made on the grounds that a fact has been discovered
which is "susceptible of exerting a decisive influence
upon a judgment." However, the request for review is
admissible only if such a fact was unknown to the Court
and to the party requesting review prior to the time the
37

challenged decision was rendered. In addition, the governments of Member States, institutions of the Communities, and any other natural or legal persons may institute "third-party" proceedings to contest judgments prejudicial to their rights that have been rendered without
their knowledge. Petitioners for such proceedings, however, must give valid reasons why they were unable to
participate in the principal proceedings before the
Court. 2• In two fairly recent decisions, the Court interpreted very narrowly the provisions regarding the contest of a judgment by third parties.2 5 It thus cut off the
possibility of developing these provisions into instruments
for liberally filing appeals against its decisions.
What are the powers of the Court to enforce its judgments? As has been pointed out earlier, in actions against
the governments of the Member States only the ECSC
Treaty permits the application of sanctions by the Community's executive organs as a means of enforcing the
Court's decisions. Against defending parties other than
the governments of the Member States, however, decisions of the Court can be enforced in all six countries.
This is done by sending the judgment to the appropriate
authorities of the Member State concerned and these authorities are obligated to execute it as if it were a local
judgment. Only the Court of Justice itself can suspend
the execution of one of its judgments.2 6
Conclusions: Up to the end of February, 1963, the Court
of Justice had rendered 95 judgments and opinions. Individuals and private enterprises freely have instituted
proceedings before the Court against the decisions of the
executive organs of the three Communities; on the other
hand, actions instituted by Member States and executive
organs of the Communities have remained the exception.
The main cause for this phenomenon appears to lie in
the fortunate fact that conflicts arising between the interests of the Member States have been rather infrequent,
and if they occurred, they were usually settled by negotiations between the governments involved. On the other
hand, the interests of different economic groups have
clashed quite often and the final arbiter in these disputes
had to be the Court of Justice.
Two major conclusions can be drawn for this brief
examination of the Court of Justice. First, the wide access to its jurisdiction by private persons, enterprises, the
institutions of the Communities, and the governments of
the Member States, coupled with its power to bind national jurisdictions, has placed the Court in a strong strategic position to develop a community-wide system of
public law. This factor, in turn, will have a significant
influence on the growth of a common, municipal law in
the Member States. There is little doubt that the case law
built by the Court will in due time induce the Member
States to harmonize pertinent segments of their national
laws, such as anti-trust statutes, either through multilateral conventions or parallel legislation. In this connection it should be noted that the EEC Treaty recommends
to the Member States the approximation of their respective municipal laws to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market. Under certain specified
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conditions this Treaty even authorizes direct intervention
by institutions of the EEC to reconcile the legislative and
administrative rules of the Member States. 2 7
The second important conclusion pertains to the consistent compliance of the governments of the Member
States with adverse decisions of the Court. Not only have
the national governments bowed to the judgments of the
Court under the ECSC Treaty which contains the "big
stick" feature of economic sanctions for enforcement of
the Court's decisions, but so far, as has been shown earlier, they also have yielded to all adverse decisions rendered under the EEC Treaty which does not provide
for the application of sanctions. The effect has been that
the national governments have adjusted their policies in
accordance with the opinions of the Court instead of
basing the formulation of their policies solely on what
they conceived to be their "national interests."
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the
Court plays and will continue to play a significant role
in the Common Market countries. 29 Indeed, over the
years, the Court has assumed a much more important
role than was envisaged by the framers of the Treaties
establishing the European Communities. This role will
become even more crucial if in the future the Communities should be enlarged by the admission of new members. The dynamic character of the Common Market
has attracted governments of states not only in Europe,
but also in the Middle East. Despite General de Gaulle's
veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market in January of this year, it appears to be not unlikely that in
time some additional states such as Denmark, Norway
and even Britain will be admitted to full membership
provided that they accept the provisions of the Treaties.
Should, in the future, an Atlantic Community emerge
from the growing European Community, the creation
of an Atlantic Community High Court of Justice, which
has been suggested, 30 would expand the process of legal
"harmonization" to both sides of the Atlantic.
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NOTES

' See for instance Time, February 22, 1963.
2
At present the Member States are France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
' Journal Officiel, October 19, 1958:453/58 and October 25,
1958:467/ 58 and 468 / 58. For details and functions of the Court
see Valentine, (1955). In consulting this book, it must be remembered that it was written prior to the establishment of the EEC and
Eura tom.
·
• Articles 32b ECSC Treaty, 167 EEC Treaty, and 139 Euratom
Treaty.
' Articles 5 and 6 of the Statute of the Court.
0
Articles 32a and b, ECSC Treaty, 166, 167 EEC Treaty, and
138 , 139 Euratom Treaty.
'For additional information see Schwartz (1954:23-41 and
138-9).
• Articles 32 ECSC Treaty, 165 ·EEC Treaty, 137 Euratom
Treaty, and 95 Rules of Procedure of the Court.
0
Articles 87 ECSC Treaty, 219 EEC Treaty, and 193 Euratom
Treaty.
10
cf. articles 33-43 , 89 ECSC Treaty, 169-184, 215 EEC Treaty,
and 141 - 155, 188 Euratom Treaty.
u Articles 33 ECSC Treaty, 173 EEC Treaty, and 146 Euratom
Treaty. The ECSC Treaty offers somewhat broader grounds for
appeals than the other Treaties.
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"Article 88 ECSC Treaty.
" Articles 169, 171 EEC Treaty and 141 , 143 Euratom Treaty.
" EEC Commission v. the Government of the Italian Republic,
Dec. No. 7 / 61 , December 19, 1961 , 7 Rec. 633 (1961); EEC Commission v. the Government of the Italian Republic, Dec. 10/ 61 ,
February 27, 1962, 8 Rec. 1 (1962); and EEC Commission v. The
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium, Dec .
No. 2 and 3/ 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.). It is interesting
to note that in the first case against Italy, the government lifted
the import restrictions before the Court pronounced its judgment.
15
Articles 41 ECSC Treaty, 177 EEC Treaty, and 150 Euratom
Treaty. The provisions in the EEC and Euratom Treaties are more
extensive than those in the ECSC Treaty.
10
Kledingverkoopbedrijf Co. de Geus v. Robert Bosch GmbH
and Willem van Rijo Co. Dec. No. 13/61, April 6, 1962, 8 Rec. 89
(1962).
17
Van Gend & Loos Co. v. the Finance Administration of the
Netherlands, Dec. No. 26/ 62, February 5, 1963, (mimeo.).
18
Valentine (1955:65-69) analyzes the competence of the Court
in great detail and classifies the various types of competence under
ten categories.
10
cf. Van Routte (1956: 187 note) and Delvaux (1956: 11, 12);
also Lagrange (1961 :394, 395, 398, 399) and Reuter ( 1961 :403405). Further see article 95 of the ECSC Treaty which requires the
Court to render an advisory opinion on the "constitutionality" of
certain proposed amendments to the Treaty.
"" cf. articles 18, 21-29 of the Statute of the Court and article
40, par. 4 and 57 of the Rules of Procedure.
2
' Articles 29-31 of the Rules of Procedure.
22
For details see article 27 of the Rules of Procedure .
"' Donner (1962:234).
" Article 41 of the Statute of the Court (EEC Treaty). Similar
provisions are found in the Statute of the Court in the ECSC and
Euratom Treaties .
'-' Breedband Co. v. Societe des Acieries du Temple, the High
Authority, et al., Dec. Nos. 42 and 49 / 59, July 12, 1962, 8 Rec.
275 ( 1962), and The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v.
Societe Commerciale A. Vloebergh and the High Authority, Dec.
No. 9 and 12/60, July 12, 1962, 8 Rec. 333 (1962).
20
Articles 44, 92 ECSC Treaty, 187, 192 EEC Treaty, and 159,
164 Euratom Treaty.
07
cf. Articles 3 (h), 100-102 EEC Treaty .
"'cf. e.g. the decision of Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany v. the High Authority, Dec. No. 3/ 58, March 8, 1960,
6 Rec. 117 (1960).
20
In three very recent decisions the Court squashed attempts
by interest groups of food producers and marketers to delay the
gradual creation of the agricultural Common Market in the six
Member countries. cf. Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de
Fruits et Legumes et al. v. the EEC Council [of Ministers], Dec.
Nos. 16/ 62 and 17/ 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.), Federation
Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en Gros des

Viandes et al. v. the EEC Council, Dec. Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22/62,
December 14, 1962, (mimeo.), and Firma Milchwerke Heinz
Woehrmann & Sohn et al. v. the EEC Commission, Dec. Nos.
31/62 and 33 / 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.).
30
See Hartley (1963: 651).
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